Really Simple AI Risk Framework

Really Simple AI Risk Framework is a catalog of AI/ML-specific risks (AIR01–AIR27 in v0), consolidated from OWASP’s Machine Learning and LLM Top 10 lists, the MIT AI Risk Repository, and internal incident learnings of our clients.

How to use this register

  1. Every AI initiative passes through four lifecycle stages: Development, Deployment, Use, and Monitoring.
  2. For the stage(s) your initiative is currently in, filter the table below and review each applicable risk (AIR##).
  3. For every risk that applies to your system, record: likelihood, impact, an owner, and a mitigation or control. Reference risks by their AIR## ID in your project’s risk log, security review, or audit so findings stay traceable back to this register. “AIR” stands for AI Risk
  4. Re-check the register at each stage transition (e.g., moving from Development to Deployment) — a risk that was out of scope earlier may now apply.
  5. Treat this as a living list: if you identify a risk not represented here, propose it for addition rather than tracking it only locally.

Stage tags below indicate where each risk is typically introduced or first exploitable — several risks span more than one stage and are tagged accordingly.

AI Risk Records (AIRs)

Filter by typical lifecycle stage:

IDRiskLifecycle Stage(s)Description
AIR01Shadow AI DeploymentsDeployment UseUndocumented/unapproved AI tool deployments by internal teams.
AIR02Supply Chain VulnerabilitiesDevelopment DeploymentVulnerability risks from dependency libraries, or third-party tools (e.g., a compromised open-source package or a poisoned pre-trained model pulled from a public model hub).
AIR03Data LeakageDevelopment UseSensitive data exposed through third-party tools & API calls.
AIR04Cross-Border Data TransferDeployment UseData processed across risky jurisdictions.
AIR05No Validation / Improper OutputUseUnsafe or misleading model outputs executed without proper validation.
AIR06Insecure Deployment PipelinesDeploymentWeaknesses in CI/CD or model deployment processes.
AIR07Critical 3rd-party DependencyDevelopment DeploymentVulnerabilities related to critical dependencies on third-party libraries or frameworks (e.g., an unpatched CVE in a core ML framework, or an outage/breaking change at a foundation-model API provider).
AIR08Excessive Agency / Over-Reliance on AIUseDecisions made without sufficient oversight or validation.
AIR09Model PoisoningDevelopmentMalicious data injected during training to manipulate model behavior.
AIR10Model Inversion / Membership InferenceUseAttackers reconstruct or identify training data from model outputs.
AIR11Poor MonitoringMonitoringNo mechanisms to track model performance, bias, usage, or anomalies or absence of regular Audit.
AIR12Feedback Loop ContaminationUse MonitoringFeedback loops when model outputs influence future inputs.
AIR13Alert FatigueMonitoringAlert systems can fail to notify or can overwhelm operators.
AIR14Insider ThreatsDevelopment Deployment UseMalicious or negligent actions by employees or contractors.
AIR15Adversarial AttacksUseA type of attack in which an attacker deliberately alters input data to mislead the model (e.g., prompt injection to bypass safety filters, or imperceptible image perturbations that fool a vision classifier).
AIR16Model DriftUse MonitoringPerformance degradation due to changing data distributions.
AIR17Implicit Bias in OutputsDevelopment UseSkewed results due to biased training data or model design (implicit only).
AIR18Critical Unintended ConsequencesDevelopment Deployment UseHarmful side-effects the model produces without explicit intent or anticipation by its designers (e.g., blackmail-like manipulation to avoid shutdown, or circumvention of its own safety safeguards during testing, poor pipeline design without proper validation for the outcomes).
AIR19Censorship/Guardrail interferenceUseModel safety mechanisms interfere with valid outputs.
AIR20Deployment misfitDeployment UseThe data distribution differs from training or model is not suitable for the deployment context.
AIR21Lack of ExplainabilityDevelopment UseInability to interpret or justify model decisions.
AIR22No AccountabilityDevelopment Deployment MonitoringUnclear who is responsible for the failures.
AIR23Unclear Model Ownership/IPDevelopmentIn case of custom development and deployment Legal risks may arise.
AIR24Output Integrity TamperingUseModel outputs are intercepted or altered in transit/storage so a downstream system acts on a manipulated result while believing it’s genuine (e.g., a man-in-the-middle attack altering a fraud-score before it reaches a decision engine).
AIR25System Prompt / Instruction LeakageUseConfidential system prompts, internal instructions, or embedded credentials are extracted by end users via crafted queries, exposing business logic or guardrail design.
AIR26RAG / Vector Store VulnerabilitiesDevelopment UseWeaknesses in embedding generation, storage, or retrieval (e.g., cross-tenant access to a shared vector database, embedding inversion revealing source documents, or poisoned documents injected into a retrieval corpus).
AIR27Unbounded ConsumptionUse MonitoringUncontrolled or excessive inference requests degrade availability or generate runaway compute costs (e.g., oversized prompts or high-volume requests exhausting GPU capacity or inflating API billing), also known as Denial of Wallet/Service.

No risks match the selected stage — try a different filter.